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RECENT CASES
TORTS-ComPAnATVE NEGLIGENCE-A COURT MoVEs TO STRIKE THE
ARBITRARY DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff's decedent died in an intersection collision. Plaintiff commenced
an action under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act,1 but instead of alleging dece-
dent had exercised "ordinary" care at the time of the accident, the plaintiff
pleaded decedent was less negligent than the defendant. The case was dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Illinois on state and federal constitutional grounds. The court found
no constitutional issue raised and declined to exercise jurisdiction. However, it
remanded the case to the Appellate Division, second department, to consider
whether, as a matter of justice and public policy, the Illinois rule of contributory
negligence should be changed. The Appellate Division held, the strict doctrine of
contributory negligence is abolished in favor of the Wisconsin system of com-
parative negligence and apportionment of damages. Since the contributory
negligence rule was created by the courts, it is within their province to change
it. A plaintiff will not be barred from recovery providing his fault was not as
great as the defendant's. Damages shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff. Maki v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d
284 (Il. App. 1967).
In nearly all state jurisdictions, a plaintiff's contributory negligence2 pre-
cludes his recovery completely 3 This result has been severely criticized. 4 The
early doctrinal history of contributory negligence provides little insight into
why it evolved as an absolute barrier to the plaintiff's case. Its introduction into
the common law is attributed to the English case of Butterfield v. Forrester,5
where it was said, "A Party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which
has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he does not
himself use common and ordinary caution to be in the right." 6 However, it is
likely that in Forrester and its progeny,7 the decision to deny the plaintiff relief
was based in proximate cause rather than contributory negligence.8 The doctrine
1. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, § I & 2 (1960).
2. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 463 (1965) defines contributory negligence as
"conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm."
3. Forty-two states, with minor variances, follow this rule.
4. See, e.g., F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1194 (1956) (there is no logical
reason why the plaintiff should be denied all recovery); 1 Thompson, Commentaries on
the Law of Negligence §§ 155-72 (1901) (the contributory negligence rule has no place
in an enlightened system of jurisprudence); Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Ill. L. Rev.
36, 37 (1944) (contributory negligence is "the harshest doctrine of the nineteenth century
known to the common law"); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 189, 201 (1950) ("[T]he . . .rule has ceased to conform to those fundamental
ideals of justice which exist today.").
5. 11 East. 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
6. Ellenborough, C.J., id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
7. Bridge v. Grand Junction Rw., 3 M & W 248 (1858); Tuff v. Warman, 5 C.B.
(N.S.) 585 (1858).
8. The Forrester court cited no authority for its decision nor did it explain the legal
principles which led to denying the plaintiff relief. Rather, it discussed its refusal to grant
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is probably best explained as a by-product of the economic upheaval of the
19th Century. Its ready adoption in the United States0 coincided with the
growth of industry and railroads during the formative period of the industrial
revolution, as it provided a convenient method to subsidize infant facilities by
insulating them from many inevitable and costly injury claims.'0 The doctrine
also conformed to the developing political and social philosophy of self-reliance
and hard individualism which underscored Nineteenth Century American
thought." To these ends, courts were willing to check juries whose provincial
mold was well suited to resolving disputes between neighbors, but who became
"incurably plaintiff minded" when dealing with wealthy and impersonal corpora-
tions.' 2 Many jurisdictions required the plaintiff to affirmatively prove his free-
dom from fault, thereby assisting the court to terminate cases as a matter of
law.
13
recovery "with a glibness suggesting that it felt it was on familiar territory." Malone, Com-
parative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125, 126 (1945). This
suggests reliance on the causation principle which had been in use by the courts since early
Anglo-Saxon times. Cf., 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 378-80 (3d ed. 1923);
see also Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1617) (liability was grounded
on the theory the actor should pay for damages he caused, without regard to fault) ; Wig-
more, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315 (1894). Further, in
Forrester as in other early contributory negligence cases, the plaintiff's negligence occurred
later in time than the defendant's and the courts emphasized the fact the damage was
"authored" entirely by the plaintiff: "If he had used ordinary care he must have seen
the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen entirely from his own fault."
Bayley, J., Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926-27 (1809). The likeli-
hood that the early contributory negligence cases were decided on a theory of proximate
cause offers some explanation why the all or nothing rule was seen to result from them.
See also Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 233, 236 (1908). Moreover, in
choosing what effect to give to the plaintiff's negligence, precedent in ancient or early
continental law for denying all relief was obscure. See Turk, Comparative Negligence on the
March, 28 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 189, 208-45 (1950); Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative
Negligence, 17 Cornell L.Q. 333, 337-38 (1932). But maritime law offered the solution of
apportioning the damages. See R. Marsden, A Treatise On the Law of Collisions at Sea
(8th ed. 1923); see also Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 C. & P. 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (C.P. 1839),
in which a jury found for the plaintiff but reduced damages were allowed as there was fault
on both sides.
9. The first cases to apply the rule were Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 13
Am. Dec. 464 (1824); Washburn v. Tracy, 2 D. Chip. (Vt.) 128, 15 Am. Dec. 661 (1824);
see also Bush v. Brainard, 1 Cow. (N.Y.) 78, 13 Am. Dec. 513 (1923). The doctrine was
quick to gain acceptance. In 1854 a Pennsylvania court stated it had been the "rule from
time immemorial, and it is not likely to be changed in all time to come." Pa. R.R. v.
Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149, 62 Am. Dec. 323, 324 (1854).
10. Malone, The Formative Period of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151, 153-
58 (1946); see also, F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at 1197.
11. See R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915 (1945).
12. Malone, supra note 10 at 153-55 (1946); see also, Barculo, J. in Haring v. New
York and Erie R.R., 13 Barb. 2, 15 (N.Y. 1853): "We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that
in certain controversies between the weak and the strong-between an humble individual and
a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally . . . run to the assis-
tance ... of the feeble." Smith, J., in Ernst v. Hudson River R.R., 24 How. Prac. 97, 106-07
(N.Y. 1862): "Their verdicts are . . . many times founded on mistakes . . . and other
errors, which make it indispensable . . . that a power of supervision and review of the
verdicts should exist in the courts, and ... be exercised with ... firmness."
13. E.g., Spencer v. Utica & Schenectady R.R., 5 Barb. 337, 338 (N.Y. 1849); Burdick
v. Worrall, 4 Barb. 596 (N.Y. 1848); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Levy, 160
If. 385, 43 N.E. 357 (1895; Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 385, 3 N.E. 356
(1885).
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Numerous theories have been advanced to explain why a negligent plaintiff
'should be denied recovery. The most common explanation is that the plaintiff's
fault is an intervening senior cause which shields the defendant's liability.14 This
view perhaps has relevance to early contributory negligence cases, 15 but as a
modern rationale it.is generally discredited. 16 For if the plaintiff's conduct is the
sole proximate cause of his injury, contributory negligence properly should not
even be considered.'7 Further, though causation and contributory negligence
are necessarily interconnected,' 8 it has been stated that this fails to justify
denying the plaintiff relief even if his conduct was a causal factor in producing
the damage.' 9 Other reasons suggested for the absolute defense are the rules
against contribution between joint tortfeasors,20 the clean hands doctrine21 and
assumption of risk.22 It has also been stated the rule has a penal basis,2 that
it serves to deter careless conduct, 24 and that the contributory negligence
doctrine exists because it would be impracticable to apportion damages, particu-
larly where juries are concerned 5 However, it is almost universally agreed
14. Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 697 (1887); see also Ware v. Saufley,
194 Ky. 53, 237 S.W. 1060 (1922); Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry. 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122
(1919); Winfield, Torts 414 (4th ed. 1948).
15. See cases cited supra notes 5 and 7.
16. It is usually dismissed on the reasoning that if the cars of a negligent X and con-
tributorily negligent Y collide, injuring bystander Z, Z may sue both X and Y, demon-
strating that X's liability is not insulated by Y's contributory negligence. Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465, 468 (1953) ; F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at 1200;
see also Lotesto v. Baker, 246 Ill. App. 425 77 N.E.2d 539 (1927); Fraser v. Flanders, 248
Mass. 62, 142 N.E. 836 (1924).
17. F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at 1200.
18. The plaintiff's negligence must be a legal cause of his injury for the doctrine to
operate. See supra note 2.
19. See J. Fleming, The Law of Torts 216-17 (2nd ed. 1961); Green, Contributory
Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rev. 3, 11-13 (1927).
20. J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law, § 460 (1st ed. 1889). But see
F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4 at 1202-03 (This fails as an explanation because the two
rules serve opposed policies; the no-contribution rule assists a plaintiff to recover,
promoting a wider distribution of loss, while contributory negligence is a defendant's doctrine
and acts to narrow the loss distribution.).
21. Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887). But see F. Harper & F.
James, supra note 4, at 1203 (There is no merit to this view for in many instances a negli-
gent plaintiff may recover, as in last clear chance and reckless conduct cases.).
22. See Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 457,
459 (1895). But see F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at 1201 (The two rules cover
different areas: assumption of risk negatives the defendant's duty and may involve reason-
able conduct by the plaintiff. Contributory negligence is a defense to a breach of duty and
only involves unreasonable plaintiffs conduct. Further, assumption of risk operates when
there is a deliberate acceptance of peril, while contributory negligence frequently involves
an inadvertent failure to recognize danger.).
23. Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Wakelin v. London & S.W.R.R., 12 A.C. 41, 45 (1886).
24. Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 Harv. L. Rev.
263, 270 (1890). But see James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953) (Con-
tributory negligence is not a deterrent, rather it hampers accident prevention by inviting
carelessness.).
25. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Geo. L.J. 674, 683-85 (1934). But see F.
Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at 1206-07 (Apportioning damages is not harder for juries,
nor would the results be less exact than determining proximate cause or the scope of risk
created by a party's conduct. Further, juries have been successfully apportioning damages
under FELA and state apportionment statutes.).
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that "no one has ever succeeded in justifying [contributory negligence] as a
policy, and no one ever will."'26
Early attempts to restrict the contributory fault doctrine were initiated
by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1858.27 In a series of cases, it was established
that a plaintiff would not be barred if his negligence was "slight" and the
defendant's negligence "gross" in comparison. 28 Though styled comparative negli-
gence, no apportionment of damages accompanied the doctrine; the plaintiff, if
given the benefit of the test, was permitted full recovery.29 However, determin-
ing vague quantitative degrees of negligence proved unworkable, resulting in
numerous appeals and reversals.30 By 1894 the doctrine was overruled and strict
contributory negligence re-established.2 1 Four other states attempted a similar
approach, but without success.
32
Other rules created to ameliorate contributory negligence have proved more
lasting. The most significant legal restriction on contributory fault is the doc-
trine of last clear chance.33 Generally, a plaintiff may fully recover despite his
own fault if he can show the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the
accident.84 Yet the doctrine's effect in undermining contributory negligence is
limited. It is inapplicable to the majority of mutual fault cases, for the defen-
dant's negligence must follow the plaintiff's in point of time for the rule to oper-
ate.3 5 Moreover, critics of contributory negligence find the last opportunity rule
equally arbitrary and unjustifiable, as it places full liability in an opposite direc-
tion by disregarding the plaintiff's negligence.36 A second plaintiff's rule prohibits
the contributory negligence defense where a defendant's conduct approaches
intent to the level of being "reckless," "wanton" or "willful," 3 7 unless the plain-
tiff's conduct can be similarly categorized. 38 Third, contributory negligence has
been disallowed where the defendant's conduct violates a statute designed to
26. Prosser, supra note 16, at 469 (1953).
27. Galena and Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 I1. 478 (1858).
28. Wabash R.R. v. Henks, 91 Ill. 406 (1879); I.C.R.R. v. Hammer, 85 Ill. 526 (1877);
Quinn v. Donovan, 85 I1. 194 (1877); I.C.R.R. v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177 (1873).
29. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28.
30. See Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N.E. 456 (1885), listing
cases reversed due to confusion generated by the doctrine.
31. Lake Shore & M.S.Ry. v. Hession, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894).
32. Kansas: Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466 (1872); Pacific R.R. v. Houts, 12 Kan.
328 (1873), overruled in Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77, 1 P. 298 (1883),
and Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 78 Kan. 39, 96 P. 346 (1903). Oregon: Bequette v.
People's Transportation Co., 2 Ore. 200 (1867), overruled implicitly in Hamerlynck v. Ban-
field, 36 Ore. 436, 59 P. 712 (1900). Tennessee: East Tenn. R.R. v. Gurley, 12 Lea (80 Tenn.)
46, 55 (1883), overruled in East Tenn. V. & G.Ry. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 12 S.W. 419 (1889);
Wisconsin: Stucke v. Milwaukee & Miss. R.R., 9 Wis. 202 (1859), overruled in Bolin v.
Chicago, St. P.M. & O.Ry., 108 Wis. 333, 84 N.W. 446 (1900).
33. The rule originated in the case of Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep.
588 (1842).
34. A full treatment of the last clear chance doctrine is beyond the scope of this
note. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479 (helpless plaintiff), 480 (inattentive
plaintiff) (1965).
35. See id. §§ 479, 480.
36. See Prosser, supra note 16, at 474.
37. Restatement, supra note 34, at § 482.
38. Id. § 482.
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protect persons considered unable to protect themselves, and the plaintiff is in the
protected class.3 9 Finally, where the injury is caused by conduct deemed "ultra
hazardous" the defendant is held strictly liable, precluding the contributory
negligence claim. 40
Compromise jury verdicts also significantly restrict the contributory negli-
gence doctrine.41 A negligent plaintiff is often awarded damages though his recov-
ery is reduced to reflect his fault.42 "We blind our eyes to the obvious reality that
in many cases juries [apportion damages] in spite of us."143 However, Dean
Prosser notes:
There are still juries which understand and respect the court's instruc-
tions on contributory negligence, just as there are other juries which
throw them out the window. . . . Above all there are many directed
verdict cases where the plaintiff's negligence, however slight it may
be... is still clear beyond dispute, and the court has no choice but to
declare it as a matter of law.44
Another approach to mitigate the seemingly unjust result of contributory negli-
gence has been to adopt a damage apportionment or comparative negligence
system.
Comparative negligence4 5 refers to a system of apportioning damages
between mutually negligent parties according to their proportionate share of
causal fault. Generally, it operates to diminish rather than preclude a negligent
plaintiff's recovery.40 The United States is the last stronghold of contributory
negligence; all other common law jurisdictions,
47 and most civil law systems, 48
utilize various forms of damage apportionment in negligence actions.
The Federal Employer's Liability Act was first major apportionment
39. Id. § 483.
40. Id. § 484.
41. See Prosser supra note 16, at 469; see also F. Harper & F. James, supra note 4, at
1228.
42. H. Kalven, Report on the Jury Project 28 (1955).
43. Holt, J., in Haeq v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261,
263 (1938); see also J. Ulman, A Judge Takes the Stand 30-34 (1933).
44. Prosser, supra note 16 at 469.
45. The term comparative negligence is misleading. Properly, it refers to a comparison
of degrees of negligence between the parties to determine if the plaintiff will be allowed all
or no recovery. See text accompanying supra notes 28-30. In the modern sense, however,
it refers to a damage apportionment system whereby damages recoverable by a negligent
plaintiff are diminished in proportion to his share of causal fault. The term is further
complicated as it is also used to describe apportionment methods utilized in several states
which operate only after the respective negligence of the parties is compared. See text ac-
companying infra notes 61-66.
46. See text accompanying infra notes 61-66.
47. See, e.g., England: Law Reform Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28; Canada: Alta.
Rev. Stat. c. 56 (1955); B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 74 (1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. 266 (1954); N.B.
Rev. Stat. c. 36 (1952); [1954] N.S. Stat. c. 51; Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 261 (1960); [1951]
P.E.I. Stat. c. 30; Quebec apportions damages without a statute. See, e.g., Nicholis Chemical
Co. v. Lefebvre, 42 Can. S. Ct. 402 (1909).
New Zealand: (1947) N.Z. Stat. No. 3 at 29.
Australia: (1947) West. Aust. Stat. No. 23.
Puerto Rico: P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31 § 5141 (Supp. 1957).
48. All of continental Europe apportions damages. See, Turk supra note 4 at 238-44.
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legislation in this country.49 The Act applies to all actions brought by interstate
railroad workers injured through the negligence of their employers, 0 and it has
provided the impetus for numerous state employer liability acts covering intra-
state railroad workers and other labor groups. These statutes nullified the de-
fense of contributory negligence but reduced recovery according to the relative
proportions of fault displayed by the parties.5 1 The apportionment approach was
also ultilized in subsequent federal legislation.52 Most state legislatures have re-
sisted appeals to enact general comparative negligence statutes.58 Courts, while
recognizing the superiority of the doctrine, have refused to judicially establish
comparative negligence on the ground that the job is one for the legislature.
It would be hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that,
in operation, the rule of comparative negligence would serve justice
more faithfully than that of contributory negligence.... But as long as
the legislature refuses to substitute the rule of comparative negligence
for that of contributory negligence we have no option to enforce the law
in a proper case.54
However, seven states utilizing three different theories presently have appor-
tionment statutes applicable to all negligence actions.5 Mississippi operates
under a "pure" form of comparative negligence, permitting the plaintiff some
recovery regardless of the proportion of fault attributed to him, so long as the
49. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), now 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1964) which provides:
[Tihe fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, that
no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty
of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common
carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the
injury or death of such employee.
50. The original 1906 Act was held unconstitutional as it applied to workers engaged
in intrastate commerce. Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). The present
statute, limited to interstate workers, was upheld in the Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
51. Prosser, supra note 16 at nn. 27, 28.
52. The FELA provision, quoted at supra note 49, was incorporated by reference
into the Jones Act and Merchant Marine Act. Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185;
June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. L. 1007, now 46 U.S.C. 688 (1964).
53. Among the articles discussing and urging the adoption of various comparative
negligence bills which have been before the New York Legislature are: Note, 25 Fordham L.
Rev. 184 (1956); Teller, Proposed Comparative Negligence Law and Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors, 5 Bklyn. Barrister 1000-04 (Jan. 1954); Kreindler, Comparative Negli-
gence in New York, 11 Bar Bull. 81 (N.Y. Co. Law. Ass'n) (1953); Note, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 458 (1947); Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L.Q. 333
(1932) ; see also bills before the Pennsylvania legislature mentioned in O'Toole, Comparative
Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal, 2 Vll. L. Rev. 474 (1957). Sherman, Comparative
Negligence, 60 Dick. L. Rev. 79 (1955); Note, 17 Temple L.Q. 276 (1943); For proposals
in other states, see, e.g., Dean & Hancock, Comparative Negligence, 8 Ala. L. Rev. 71 (1955);
30 Chi. B. Rec. 391 (1949); Neef, Comparative Negligence, 27 Mich. S.B.J. 34 (May, 1948).
54. Haeq v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938);
i=enthorne v. Hopwood, 218 Ore. 336, 338 P.2d 373, 375 (1959).
55. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27.1730.2 (1961); Ga. Code § 105-603 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1965); Miss. Code Ann. § 1454 (1942); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151
(1956); S. D. Code § 47.0304(1) (Supp. 1960); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
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defendant is found negligent.50 Thus, if a plaintiff is 50 per cent negligent and
has damages of $10,000, the defendant, assuming he has no damages, will be
liable for $5,000. If the defendant in this situation has damages and counter-
claims, a set-off occurs. A plaintiff undek this system may pursue his cause of
action in all cases where the contributory negligence doctrine would have
barred him completely.57 The other two forms of comparative negligence are
more limited, requiring a preliminary comparison of the negligence of the par-
ties before apportionment is allowed. Two states permit apportionment only
when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is found to be "slight" and the
defendant's "gross" in comparison. 58 Wisconsin59 and three other states6 ° utilize
a "percentage of fault," or modified comparative negligence approach; appor-
tionment is permitted only if the plaintiff's fault is found to have been less than
the defendant's. Contributory negligence still operates under these statutes
when the plaintiff's negligence is found to be equal to or greater than the fault
of the defendant. This aspect of Wisconsin's system has been called "absurd"
because its effect is to allow a substantial recovery to a plaintiff found 49 per
cent negligent, but bars him completely if he is found 50 per cent negligent.61
Once the plaintiff clears this barrier his recovery is "diminished in the propor-
tion to the amount of negligence attributable to [him]. ' 162 The Wisconsin
56. Miss. Code. Ann. § 1454 (1942) provides:
In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries or where such injuries have
resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the
owner of the property, or person having control over the property may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person injured, or the owner of the property, or the person having control over
the property.
57. See, e.g., Pevey v. Alexander Pool Co., 244 Miss. 25, 139 So. 2d 847 (1962) (Con-
tributory negligence is not a bar to a cause of action in Mississippi.); Cobb v. Williams,
228 Miss. 418, 90 So. 2d 17 (1956).
58. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (1956); S. D. Code § 47.0304(1) (Supp. 1960). The
Nebraska statute provides in part: "[Tlhe fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison ... ." This
form of comparative negligence is extremely limited. Only in a minority of cases will the
plaintiff's negligence be "slight" and the defendant's "gross" in comparison. For the treat-
ment given this test by the courts of the two states see, e.g., Brackman v. Brackman, 169
Neb. 650, 100 N.W.2d 774 (1960); Malcolm v. Dox, 169 Neb. 539, 100 N.W.2d 538 (1960);
Allen v. Kavanaugh, 160 Neb. 645, 71 N.W.2d 119 (1955); Ford v. Robinson, 76 S.D. 457,
80 N.W.2d 471 (1957); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943).
59. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958) provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury
to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person
recovering.
60. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27.1730.2 (1961); Ga. Code § 105-603 (1956); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1965).
61. C. Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions 64 (1936) ; see also
Campbell, Wisconsin Law Governing Automobile Accidents-Part II, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 557,
569.
62. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
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Supreme Court, in Cameron v. Union Automobile Insurance Co.,03 interpreted
this provision to mean the plaintiff's percentage of fault acts to reduce his
recovery by the proportion it bears to the total negligence of the parties. Thus
if the plaintiff is found 25 per cent negligent, he may recover 75 per cent of his
damages. No set-off would occur if the defendant also has damages; he is pre-
cluded as his negligence is greater than the plaintiff's. 64 Damage apportionment
becomes more complex where multiple defendants are involved. In Walker v.
Kroger Grocery and Baking Co.,65 it was stated that damages may be recovered
only from those defendants adjudged more negligent than the plaintiff. Thus,
for example, if the plantiff is found 25 per cent at fault, Dl 20 per cent and
D2 55 per cent negligent, no recovery may be had against D1, but D2 will be
liable for 75 per cent of the plaintiff's damages. It has also been held the plain-
tiff may proceed to collect his entire damages from any of the defendants
adjudged liable to him, but subsequent contribution among defendants is deter-
mined according to their proportionate share of causal fault.06 And, in Johnsen
v. Pierce,61 it was established that any negligence imputed to the plaintiff is
added to his own negligence to determine his percentage of fault with respect
to all defendants in the action.
Wisconsin utilizes a special verdict procedure in administering its compara-
tive negligence system.68 A series of specific questions pertaining to the negli-
gence of the parties, their percentage of fault, and damages are submitted to the
jury.69 The jury is not told the effect of its answers. In DeGroot v. Van Ak-
keren,70 it was held reversible error to read the apportionment statute to the
jury. Once the jury returns its answers, the court apportions the damages and
enters the verdict. Though exercising some control over the jury through the
special verdict, in Kohler v. Dumke7' the court reiterated its refusal to set out
mechanical formulae for the jury to follow in deciding the ratio by which the
combined negligence of the parties should be distributed. Only in the "rare"
case will the court intervene to deny the plaintiff recovery as a matter of law,
because his negligence is greater than the defendant's.
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63. 211 Wis. 405, 247 N.W. 453 (1933) (per curiam).
64. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 331.045 (1958).
65. 214 Wis. 519, 535-36, 252 N.W. 721-28 (1934).
66. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). Thus if DI is 80%
negligent and D2 found 20% negligent, P may collect his whole damages from either D1 or
D2 or both. But if D2 pays the entire amount, Dl will be liable to him in a contribution
action for 20 per cent of that amount. The 507o plaintiff bar rule, in text accompany supra
note 61, does not apply to contribution.
67. 262 Wis. 367, 55 N.W.2d 394 (1952) (the fault share of the parties was P, 10%, D1,
45% and D2, 45%, with the negligence of D1 imputed to P. Thus P's share of fault became
55% which barred her action completely as her proportion of fault was greater than both
the defendants).
68. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 270.27 (1958).
69. The general form is set out in Prosser, supra note 16, at 497-98.
70. 224 Wis. 105, 273 N.W. 725 (1937).
71. 13 Wis. 2d 211, 216, 108 N.W.2d 581, 584 (1961).
72. See, e.g., Korleski v. Lane, 10 Wis. 2d 163, 102 N.W.2d 234 (1960); Wasilowski v,
Chicago North West. Ry., 259 Wis. 522, 525, 49 N.W.2d 481, 482 (1951).
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In the instant case, the court determined the Wisconsin approach to be
superior to the common law rule of contributory negligence, since apportionment
produces a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss. Justice Moran,
writing for a unanimous court, reasoned that the party most responsible for the
injury should bear the primary liability. As a corollary, a plaintiff who is
secondarily negligent should be permitted to recover in proportion to his free-
dom from fault. The inequities of the contributory negligence rule were treated
as self-evident. After an examination of the rule's history in Illinois, the court
concluded that the historical purpose of protecting the growth of industry and
railroads no longer provided a valid justification for retaining the contributory
negligent doctrine. Defendant urged that exchanging the common law rule for
a comparative fault and damage apportionment system would have the effect
of discouraging pre-trial settlements, congest the calendar with cases of ques-
tionable liability, and result in higher insurance rates. These arguments were
discounted:
In determining the public policy of this state we are not impressed by
the arguments pertaining to administrative and procedural prob-
lems. Substantive rights are involved in our determination and even,
were the more desirable rule to result in increased administrative com-
plications, expense or delay we would feel it should be adopted and that
suitable steps be taken to resolve the resulting procedural problems.73
Further, the court listed purported procedural merits of comparative negligence
as enumerated in a 1962 committee report of the Illinois Judicial Conference.74
It was stated an apportionment system would encourage pre-trial settlements
and jury waivers, and would tend to eliminate the need for trial specialists and
docket delays. The court did not indicate whether it agreed with these conten-
tions. Justice Moran did suggest, however, that a comparative negligence system
would "eliminate the need for continued adherence to the fictions of 'active-
passive' or 'primary-secondary' negligence, for actions for contribution or indem-
nification will fall under the same rule as original actions for the recovery of
damage."
75
In choosing the form of comparative negligence to be adopted, the Wisconsin
approach was found "closest to our needs," and in conformity with "present day
concepts of equality, justice and sensibility. "76 The court concluded the system
had proved satisfactory in Wisconsin and that the special verdict procedures
utilized there could be adopted in Illinois. Though the pure form of comparative
negligence followed in Mississippi was cursorily examined, it was not stated why
the Wisconsin system offered the more suitable approach. The court noted, it
was not "unmindful that the Wisconsin rule has been criticized as being absurd
in that a plaintiff almost as negligent as a defendant may recover a substantial
73. Maki v. Frelk, 229 NXE.2d 284, 290 (Ill. App. 1967).
74. W. Atten and D. Burrell, Should Illinois Adopt a Comparative Negligence Statute,
51 Ill. B.J. 194, 197-98 (1962).
75. Mad v. Frelk, 229 N.E.2d 284, 290 (Ill. App. 1967).
76. Id. at 290.
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portion of his damages but may not recover a cent if both parties are equally
negligent.1
77
The most significant aspect of the holding was that the abolishment of the
strict contributory negligence rule should properly be undertaken by the courts.
Indeed, the court reasoned it was "duty bound" to make the change:
The doctrine of contributory negligence was created by the courts, not
by the legislature. If we have created it, and if it does not meet the
needs of present day life, then we are duty bound to abolish it.78
Though noting other state courts had taken contrary positions, the court found
precedent for its view in Molitor v. Kaneland Com. Unit. Dist.79 There, the
Illinois Supreme Court overruled the doctrine of school district immunity,
despite arguments that the change should be left to the legislature.
The contributory negligence rule, despite its administrative simplicity,
cannot be justified today in either legal principle or policy. The best that can
be said for the doctrine-that it is not as bad as it seems because juries have
the good sense to disregard it-is merely another argument for its abolition.
Though the rule has retained its place in American civil law, its eventual demise
is inevitable. The increase in negligence litigation, spurred particularly by auto-
mobile accident cases, points to the need for a system capable of equitably and
efficiently handling mutual fault situations while providing for a more acceptable
distribution of loss. The only serious questions are who should make the change,
and what form the change should take.
It would be desirable for comparative negligence to be promulgated legisla-
tively. Several forms of apportionment are available to replace contributory
negligence, and choosing the most appropriate is purely a policy decision. Fur-
ther, more than just the rule of contributory negligence should be changed.
Various areas of negligence law, such as contribution"° and the last clear chance
doctrine,81 should also be revised or rejected to create an integrated and consis-
tent apportionment system. Similarly, procedural devices such as the special
verdict82 and a method for dealing with suits involving multiple parties should
be introduced into an apportionment system.83 It is noteworthy, however, that
77. Id. at 291.
78. Id.
79. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 25, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959).
80. If the plaintiff does not bring this action against all possible defendants, those
defendants in the action should be permitted to join others who may also be liable to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff should still be permitted to secure a full recovery from any
of the defendants. See C. Gregory, supra note 61, at 38-39. But in actions for contribution,
the liability of the unpaid defendants should rest on their respective proportion of fault
determined in the original action. See text accompanying supra note 66. But no defendant
should be absolved of liability because his fault was less than the plaintiff's.
81. The last clear chance rule should be abolished. Its purpose, to protect the plaintiff
from the contributory negligence bar, would be served by apportioning damages.
82. See text accompanying supra notes 68 and 69. This provides an important check
on the jury and lessens the likelihood of arbitrary verdicts.
83. See C. Gregory, supra note 61, at 88-113, discussing methods for handling multiple
party litigation.
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those legislatures which enacted comparative negligence statutes have been con-
tent to leave the problem of resolving inconsistencies to the courts.8 4
But courts should not be precluded from entering the field. The position
taken in the instant case-that courts may make the change-is valid to the
extent contributory negligence remains in case law form. Courts should not be
bound to administer mechanically a judge-made law which not only fails to serve
the purpose for which it was designed, but also works substantial injustice.
In the instant case, the central reasons espoused by the courts for establish-
ing comparative negligence in Illinois were to promote an equitable distribution
of loss by ending the arbitrary doctrine that a negligent plaintiff be denied all re-
covery. Yet the Wisconsin system, while a substantial improvement over the strict
rule of contributory negligence, does not fully conform to this goal. Contributory
negligence will still bar a plaintiff if his proportion of fault in causing the injury
was greater than the defendant's. In short, the Wisconsin approach is a compro-
mise between the strict rule and a complete apportionment system. It may seem
logical to deny recovery if the plaintiff's conduct was the senior cause of his
injury, but in a system of negligence based on fault, with the central considera-
tion aimed at achieving a wide and fair distribution of loss, it frequently is more
logical to hold a party liable for the damages caused by his proportionate share
of negligence. This theory is embodied in the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and Mississippi approach. A plaintiff is allowed some recovery whatever his
proportion of fault, so long as part of the damage was caused by the defendant's
negligence. Thus, if the plaintiff is 90 per cent negligent, the defendant will be
liable for the injury he caused or 10 per cent of the plantiff's damages. Under the
Wisconsin system, the plaintiff will recover nothing and the defendant who
shared in causing the injury is allowed to go free. Further, under the full appor-
tionate approach, if the defendant also suffered damages in the accident, his
liability to the plaintiff would be reduced even though his share of fault may be
greater than the plaintiff's. The result is equitable since each party pays for the
damage attributable to his share of fault. It is also socially desirable, as a full
loss distribution is achieved. This system, coupled with a careful integration of
conflicting negligence law such as contribution and last clear chance, as well as
the special verdict and a provision for apportionment between multiple defen-
dants, would embody the most comprehensive approach to comparative
negligence.
But the court in the instant case hardly considered the more liberal form of
comparative negligence. Rather, it chose to turn to the Wisconsin approach even
while admitting that system, in at least one respect, was inherently absurd. Yet
the very fact the court was willing to adopt the more limited Wisconsin system
was a major step. Indeed, no court in modern times has gone so far in this area.
The end result is theoretically not as perfect a system of apportionment as could
84. See supra note 55 and text accompanying supra notes 65-67.
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have been adopted. Nevertheless, it represents a major improvment over the
strict doctrine of contributory negligence.
ARTHUR M. GEL I!AN
TORTS-LIBEL-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
Plaintiffs, two teachers at Queens College, had repeatedly charged they were
denied promotion because of religious discrimination. The President of Queens
College, defendant Stoke, with the approval of the New York City Board of
Higher Education, issued a press release denying anti-Catholic discrimination
at the college and attributing plaintiffs' inability to obtain promotions to their
lack of suitable qualifications for advancement. Plaintiffs sued for libel alleging
they were defamed by the press release. Defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment based on absolute privilege was denied by the trial court. The appellate
division reversed the ruling on the motion and dismissed the case. The New York
Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, held, the New York City Board of
Higher Education is an important agency of municipal government with sub-
stantial duties and responsibilities affecting a large number of people, and issu-
ance of the press release was a proper exercise of discretion because of the
widespread publicity which the charges of bias at Queens College had received.
Therefore the Board and President Stoke were entitled to invoke absolute privi-
lege as a complete bar to the suit. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 222 N.E.2d
721, 276 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1966).
The law of defamation recognizes truth and privilege as its two principal
defenses. The establishment of either acts as a complete bar to a suit for libel.'
The defense of privilege is further divisible into absolute privilege2 and qualified
privilege.3 If an individual's statements are absolutely privileged, he is protected
from liability for defamation even though his statements were made maliciously.4
By contrast, if a person possesses only a qualified privilege, the immunity can be
defeated by proof that his statements contain an element of malice.5 Proof of
actual malice requires the plaintiff to show personal spite or ill will, or culpable
recklessness or negligence on the part of defendant. 6 The doctrine of absolute
privilege was first extended by constitutional mandate and judicial decision to the
legislative7 and judicial s branches of government. Executive immunity developed
1. See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 109, at 795 (3d ed. 1964).
2. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
3. Ashcroft v. Hammond, 197 N.Y. 488, 90 N.E. 1117 (1910).
4. See 1 Fowler Harper & Fleming James Jr., Torts § 5.21, at 420 (1956).
5. For the distinction between absolute privilege and qualified privilege in defamation
see id.
6. Shapiro v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 7 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 163 N.E.2d 333, 336,
194 N.Y.S.2d 509, 513 (1959).
7. U.S. Const. art. I, § 6; for a discussion of absolute privilege in defamation suits
concerning the legislative branch see Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceedings, 10 Colum. L. Rev. 131 (1910).
